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Abstract: 
In  1998,  Clark  and  Chalmers  addressed  a  question  that  remained  pivotal  in  the
discussion afterwards: “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?”
Their inquiry, developed by many others, led to a questioning of the idea of the mind as
a thing – a simple res cogitans – with a precise localization. I will discuss their theses,
trying to show that the views of the pragmatists can provide us with a different scenario
(different but sympathetic nevertheless with some of Clark’s and Chalmers’s theses).
For example, Peirce doesn’t think we have to choose between an internalist stance
(mind is equivalent to brain and is inside our body) and an externalist one (mind extends
itself outside the skin and the skull), because “mind”, as any other thing, is “wherever it
acts” (W 5:78), wherever it produces habits of behavior, wherever it guides action and
produces “conscious” effects. For Peirce, as well as for Mead, habit is the key-word, not
consciousness, not mind. Habit is not internal, and not properly external. It is something
that lives “in the exercises that nourish it” and in the “actions to which it gives rise” (CP
5.487). The social origin of consciousness, and the relevance of habits, as social and
public structures that situate the mind, are effective pragmatist keys of interpretation
that can enhance the actual field of the cognitive sciences.
I will finally present a theoretical hypothesis on the role of the mind in cognition, based
not on the extension of it, but, so to say, on the “intension”. In this sense, the cognitive
can be read as the “intensive” trait of the pragmatic.
Keywords: Mead, Extended Mind, Habit, Consciousness, Social Theory of Mind
In their pivotal 1998 article “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers
advance the following important claims: 1) there is no line of demarcation between skin
and skull and what is outside them; 2) cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head; 3)
there  is  an active  role  of  the  environment  in  driving cognitive  processes;  4)  even
portable,  external  devices are part  of  our beliefs,  that  is,  are to be considered as
‘mental’ states (see the much cited case of Otto’s notebook). In this paper, I will confine
myself  to  a  few  comments  on  Clark’s  and  Chalmers’s  article  and  on  some  later
adjustment of the theory. Clark and Chalmers stress very important issues, in particular
the question of the boundary between what is inside human cognition and what is
outside, the question of the localization of thought, and the question of the possible
extension of mind.
Yet,  I  will  contend  that,  although  innovative,  their  position  still  suffers  from  a
metaphysical prejudice. First, Clark and Chalmers – and the majority of the leading
cognitive thinkers who follow them – reason from the standpoint of the privilege of the
mind (even though “extended”), never questioning its priority in a productive knowledge
Fabbrichesi, “Peirce, Mead, and the Theory of Extended Mind” | 2
Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce (http://www.commens.org)
and  the  occasions  of  its  emergence.  Second,  they  rely  on  categories  such  as
“localization”  and  “extension,”  which  are  still  the  mark,  in  my  opinion,  of  a
Cartesian horizon.
I will try to show that the views of the pragmatists can provide us with a different
scenario (different but sympathetic nevertheless with some of Clark’s and Chalmers’s
theses). My aim is not to simply compare C. S. Peirce, G. H. Mead, and Clark-Chalmers,
but to present a theoretical hypothesis on the role of the mind in cognition. For the
notion of “Mind” is a recurrent one in contemporary debates, but, as any other notion, it
has undergone several modifications of meaning over time. For instance, it might be
helpful to briefly remind us that in the Iliad the word that is usually translated as “mind”
is expressed by terms which refer to the different parts of the body: phrenes, the lungs;
ker, the heart; thymos, the breathing spirit; noos, the sharp sight. All these terms refer
to externally-induced bodily modifications that force the hero to respond through a
series of actions. These are not tied to physical organs as we understand them today,
but to cosmic powers of divine origin, capable of dominating and guiding men’s life.
They are personified forces and powers, codified in the epic poems and their myths. In
this view, men feel and reason, choose and deliberate because the breath, the heart
beating,  and  the  sight  dictate  them  to  do  so.  The  word  “mind”,  which  has  its
etymological root in menos, the impetus that runs through the body and compels to act,
develops through the Odyssey, Plato, and the Stoics, until it becomes the Latin mens in
which it is not possible to find any reference to body and physical emotions.1 Through a
long and complex process of semantic transformations, then, the “mind” ends up being
localized  in  the  head,  “inside  the  skin  and  the  skull,”  where  Clark  and  Chalmers
eventually find it.
During the Modern epoch, the priority of alethic and rational knowledge (manthano),
made possible by the “Cogito,” led TO an understanding of the “mind” as the privileged
seat  of  thoughts,  beliefs,  sentiments,  and  self-consciousness.  However,  it  is  worth
stressing again the fact that for hundreds of years the idea of something reflexive and
internal had been simply unimaginable.
I have advanced these brief philological remarks simply to remind us that we should
never forget that the concepts we use, in particular when we speak of epistemology, are
not given facts, but the result of a complex genealogy.
The evolutionistic hypothesis of the pragmatists of a progressive and slow change of the
“mental” through the development of more or less conscious habits of response to the
environment is crucial here. As many admit today, the mind undergoes a progressive
biological evolution, not only neural but also bio-social. But we find the same evolution
in the common use and meaning of the word “mental” and in the distinction between
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what is “internal” and what is “external.” There is, then, a process of unlimited semiosis
involving not only the strictly scientific hypothesis, but also our epistemic understanding
of what counts as an “internal” state. As Mead efficaciously states: “some sort of an
ongoing social process in which human beings were implicated must have been there in
advance of the existence of minds and selves in human beings, in order to make possible
the development, by human beings, of minds and selves within or in terms of that
process” (Mead 1934: 227).
Let us go back to the article The Extended Mind. “Where does the mind stop and the
world begin?”, Chalmers and Clark wonder at the outset. Their response is the proposal
of an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving the
cognitive processes. There is a general tendency in the human reasoning to lean heavily
on environmental supports, starting from pen and paper (I think with my pen, wrote
Wittgenstein) up to the iPhone and the tablets. These are not to be simply intended as
tools for knowledge and better reasoning, as additions to the faculties of my mind as
practical aids; rather, they are literally parts of my mind’s domain, they are the mind, as
a whole. Let us consider a very clear example in the text and then comment on it in the
light of some of Peirce’s theses. The fish can be considered as a “swimming device,” due
to an evolved capacity to couple its swimming behaviors to the pools of external kinetic
energy found as swirls, eddies, and vortices in its watery environment. Some of these
vortices are naturally built, other are induced by the movements of the fish. “The fish
swims  by  building  these  externally  occurring  processes  into  the  very  heart  of  its
locomotion routines. The fish and surrounding vortices together constitute a unified and
remarkably efficient swimming machine.” (Clark and Chalmers 1998: § 3)
In a cognitive field, words, images and external symbols play a role very similar to these
vortices. Clark and Chalmers brilliantly show that there is something like a “mind”
where there is something functioning as a cognitive device. “If a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the
cognitive process.” (Clark and Chalmers 1998: § 2) There can be, then, a coupling, a
parity  between  internal  and  external,  cognition  and  environment.  “If  so  the  mind
extends into the world.” The mind – to quote another important book by Clark – is
supersized (Clark 2008).
Following a consideration of parity, any outward loop is a functional part of an extended
cognitive machine, of the cognitive circuit. “Such cycles supersize the mind.” (Clark
2008: iii)  Trying to oppose a brain-bound model to an extended one, Clark asks if
cognitive processes stay neatly in the brain. His response is negative, as we saw, but the
question frames the very borders of the reply: where do these cognitive processes take
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place? They spread over anywhere there are cognitive effects, we read here and there in
his books. Mind is simply supersized, but its status remains that of a res extensa, a size
(situs) dimension, an horizontal dimension.
In  what  follows  I  will  comment  on  these  points,  by  objecting  in  particular  to  the
following tenets: 1) the mind, although in its augmented version, should be considered
anyway the center of irradiation of the cognitive process. In other words, Clark and
Chalmers move from the received idea of mind and put forth a conception in which the
function and size of the mind are changed, but they never question the allegedly central
role that the mind plays in cognition. The mind remains pivotal: only, it is made larger
and  more  elastic  (>we  could  refer  here  to  the  so-called  ‘cognitive  bloating’).  2)
Similarly, the dimensional element is never discussed. The mind is interpreted as pure
extensiveness.  Something is  either  inside  or  outside  of  it.  It  remains  necessary  to
localize where the cognitive takes place. These are all unwittingly assumed Cartesian
metaphors.2 Also, 3) the principle of parity is an ultimately dualist principle: the starting
point is always the idea of two parts that need to be somewhat coupled, con-joined. put
back together.
Let us consider the often quoted example of Otto, the man affected by the Alzheimer’s
disease to whom Clark and Chalmers attribute an experimental “extended mind.” Otto
uses a notebook on which he writes the location of the museum that he wants to visit.
Any time he wants to go there, he reads his notes. The notebook plays the role usually
played by a biological memory. It functions exactly like the information constituting an
ordinary non-occurrent belief; it simply happens that this information lies beyond the
skin.  In Otto’s  case,  as in a normal person’s case,  that  information is  available to
consciousness and available to guide action, exactly in the same way in which a belief
usually is. And when an external device plays the same role that a belief plays, it can be
considered equally “mental.”
This a good way to discuss ‘truly’ mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and emotions.
Yet, Peirce would have remarked that Otto’s notebook has to be considered part of
cognition simply because it guides habits of conduct (the habit of walking quietly to the
museum). Any thought is a belief, and any belief is a rule of action, or a habit. In
Peirce’s view, we leave the domain of cognition and enter that of action. “The essence of
the belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the
different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if
they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action” then there is no real
difference between them (W 3:263-4). Thought is an action, writes Peirce. The case of
Otto and Inga (Otto’s partner who finds in her “head” and not IN a notebook the
directions to get around) is then paradigmatic. The types of action to which their beliefs
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lead are similar. They both reach the museum and it is inessential to understand what
device enables them to do so. It does not matter whether it is the leading-function of an
“inside” state, the belief embedded in memory, or the leading-function of an information
coming from “outside”: in both cases Otto and Inga get to the museum. For pragmatism,
the  consequences  are  the  only  important  feature  of  epistemic  knowledge.  The
pragmatistic approach makes it possible to have a different perspective on the issue
stated by Clark and Chalmers: it focuses first on the effects and practical consequences,
and only later tackles the problem of meaning in terms of cognition, mind, mental state.
Moreover, it applies the pragmatic maxim to the question whether there is a difference
between knowing the correct directions by relying on the mnestic traces in memory and
in a notebook. And of course the answer will be negative, because in both cases what is
produced is an effective habit of conduct. Cognition for Peirce is an infinite process of
beginning, and there is no cognition not determined by a previous cognition and not
resulting in a practical, ‘extended’ effect. A position evidently very far from the one that
defines cognition in terms of computations performed on representations.3
Habit is then a key word for all the pragmatists, in particular the classical pragmatists,
who were closer to the debate on evolutionism. This word makes the traditional dualistic
attitude of thinking explode. The habit defines the threshold preceding the distinction
between inside and outside, physical and psychical, natural and social. Drawn from the
empiricist tradition, it simply indicates a recurrent and efficient pattern of behavior,
often unconscious, nourished by the exercises that determine it. Habit is simply the
disposition to act in predictable ways under certain conditions. A disposition that is not
strictly speaking mental, nor simply practical: a knowing-how that can be extended to
the entire physical world because it corresponds to the “tendency to behave in a similar
way under similar circumstances in the future” (EP 2:413). The meaning of a concept,
its  Final  Logical  Interpretant,  writes Peirce,  is  a habit  of  response.  “Not only may
generals be real, but they may also be physically efficient […] no sane man doubts that if
I feel the air in my study to be stuffy, that thought may cause the window to be opened.”
(EP 2:343) A physical effort is brought into existence by the efficiency of a general and
non-existent truth, that is, the general proposition “stuffy air is unwholesome”.
Let us consider again the example of the fish: the fish was defined as a swimming device
(referring to his know-how, to his habit of behavior). And this capacity to swim was
gained by the repetitions of processes naturally occurred or self-induced that were part
of  the fish conduct along the sea.  So,  the fish with  its  habits  of  response and  its
environment,  all  together,  constitute  the  swimming  “substance.”  The  fish  plus  its
behaviors are not in question, but the behaviors that make a fish what it is are.
In the second part of the 1800S, Peirce raised and in part solved many problems that
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Clark and Chalmers have found at the end of the following century without knowing his
lesson.  For instance,  we read in  a  1866 passage:  “Whether there be any ultimate
premises  is  a  difficult  question.  It  amounts,  however  merely  to  this;  whether  the
boundary of consciousness is in consciousness or out of it” (W 1:515). What is the nature
of a limit? Properly speaking, it belongs neither to one thing nor to the other thing that
it distinguishes. “The limit between red and blue is neither red nor blue, or, better, it is
both red and blue – the distinction between them vanishing at this point” (W 1:203-4).
Then, according to the argument we saw above we should say that the limit between the
mind and the world, between the skull and my iPhone, vanishes when we start to focus
on the boundary that separates them, trying to localize it, simply because when we
speak of the mind and the world we are not talking about two containers, and we should
not be using spatial metaphors.
This led Peirce over the years to reject with growing determination a spatial view of
consciousness and mind: “A thing may be said to be wherever it acts; but the notion that
a particle is absolutely present in one part of space and absolutely absent from all the
rest of space is devoid of all foundation” (W 5:79). Similarly, it makes little sense to
think of the mind “as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to be out of it” (W2:
471.) So, HERE IT IS Peirce who talks, BUT I think Clark would have agreed completely:
“When a thing is in such relation to the individual mind that that cognizes it, it is in the
mind; and its being so in the mind will not in the least diminish its external existence”
(W 2:471). We should therefore overcome an internalist and nominalist conception of
thinking. “It is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in any printed
copy of his book than they are in his brain” (CP 7.364). We should say, then, that
Peirce’s approach is a non-local and non-spatial view of the mind; rather, it is a temporal
doctrine of the mind (“mellonized”, writes Peirce AT CP 8.284, from the Greek mellon,
which could be translated with “oriented towards the future”). The mind will be found
where it will produce effects, in terms of awareness and acknowledgment, where it will
guide the  action,  where it  will  be  possible  to  individuate  the  signs  of  a  cognitive
experience. The “mental” is identified with some specific habits of action. “Mind is a
sign  developing  according  to  the  laws  of  inference”  (EP  1:53).  The  phenomenal
manifestation of a substance is the substance itself: there is no mind except where there
are “mental” signs and mental habits of cognition and recognition. That is the reason
why  Otto’s  notebook  has  the  same  function  (phenomenal  manifestation)  as
Inga’s  memory.
I want to move now to a different author, George Herbert Mead, not to establish an
historical  comparison between Clark,  Peirce  and Mead (which would  be extremely
interesting),  but  to  try  to  show  that  Mead’s  idea  of  the  evolution  of  mind  and
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intelligence can solve some difficulties present in the cognitivist approach.
In Mead’s opinion, the mind is the result of evolutionary habits of conduct, rather than a
biological endowment or the real center of cognitive and linguistic affairs.
Reflective, creative, responsible, self-conscious mind appears as a result of repeated
social responses. It belongs to the natural history, to the long run of evolution, of social
evolution, and not simply to brain structures. Mind and intelligence are adaptive results,
constituted thanks to the use of linguistic and behavioral practices.
Mead thus distanced himself from Baldwin and Wundt who in some sense presupposed
antecedently existent minds to get the social process under way, and from Watson, who
was  attentive  only  to  the  mechanisms  of  behavior  and  not  to  the  genesis  of
consciousness.  His  analysis  is  more  convincing.  In  what  he  calls  conversation  of
gestures, for example between two dogs engaged in a fight, there are no symbolic
meanings and no minds, but just gestures and reciprocal adjustments. To acquire a
“mind,” the biological individual must be able to call out in himself the response that his
gesture calls out in the other, and to use this response of the other to control his own
further conduct. These gestures become significant symbols, evolving especially from
the initial vocal gestures. Through their use the individual “takes the role of the other”
(Mead 1934: Ch. 2). Man is essentially a role-taking animal (a habit-taking): the use of
socially shared symbols shows that he has finally acquired a mind.
In this sense, mind is simply the name that designates the assumption in behavior of
significant symbols. Mind is first and foremost a semiotic mind, Peirce would have said.
It amounts to an unlimited semiosis translated into vocal gestures and internalized in
thoughts. This is the crucial point. For Mead, mind is “the internalization” within the
individual of the social process of communication in which meanings emerge. It is the
ability to indicate to one’s self the response that one’s gesture evokes in the others.
“Instead of beginning with individual minds and working out to society, Mead starts
with an objective social process and works inward through the importation of the social
process of  communication into the individual  by the medium of  the vocal  gesture”
(Morris  in Mead 1934:  xxii).  Mind is  wholly  social,  that  means truly external.  The
process goes outward-inward, from the pragmatic acts to the individual thoughts. “Only
in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of minds or intelligence
possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking –
which is simply internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by
means of  such gestures  –  take place.  The internalization in  our  experience of  the
external conversation of gestures which we carry on with other individuals in the social
.process is the essence of thinking.” (Mead 1934: 47) Mind thus emerges and evolves;
and the taking of the attitude of the others toward one’s self is a constitutive part of its
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genesis. What is important to underline is that initially the gesture simply means what
one is going to do about it. It does not mean what one thinks nor any internal emotion.
There is an undoubted priority of the act, of which the gesture is just the primordial
nucleus. If, as Wundt does, you presuppose the existence of mind at the start, then the
origin  of  minds  and  the  interaction  with  the  other  minds  and  the  world  remain
mysterious.  But if  you regard the pragmatic  process of  experience as prior  to the
existence  of  minds,  then  you  can  easily  explain  that  mind  arises  through
“communication  by  a  conversation  of  gestures  in  a  social  process  or  context  of
experience – not communication through mind” (Mead 1934: 50).
Let me try now to recap the main points of Mead’s view. Human evolution begins with
some acts that determine certain lines of conduct. There is no coupling here between
stimulus and response, since the fundamental phenomenon is the pragmatic unity of the
act. The real beginning, as Dewey said, is not the stimulus, but the act [Dewey 1896].
The response is not merely to the stimulus, it is into it. The world is definitely “mapped
out  for  us  by  the  responses  which  are  going  to  take  place”  (Mead  1934:  129).
Knowledge is then the constant reconstitution of a circuit (think to the fish example),
and not an arrow that goes from inside to outside and the other way around. Language
is  obviously  fundamental  in  this  constitution.  “Language as  made up of  significant
symbols is what we mean by mind” (Mead 1934: 190, n. 18).
Mead’s position is substantially indebted to the evolutionary spirit of his time and in
particular to the work of Chauncey Wright, who was the real mediator, so to speak,
between Darwin and the Metaphysical Club of the first pragmatists in Cambridge. The
shared idea of  an evolutionary mind produced by an often unconscious process of
selection applied to the big variations in language, capable to lead to higher levels,
conscious and intelligent levels of communication, as already Darwin had intuited, is not
strange at all. It would be a case of “new uses of old powers” (as Wright [2000: 199-200]
explains it).
Mead (1934: 49) asserts that the advantage of his position is that it explains the genesis
and  development  of  mind,  without  presupposing  it  at  the  origin  of  any  cognitive
function. We may say that it could be better interpreted as a leading function, to use
Jamesian terminology. The human being’s physiological capacity for developing mind or
intelligence  is  a  product  of  the  process  of  biological  evolution,  but  the  actual
development of mind as an interior endowment is a product of social processes, of the
evolution of our interactions with the others.
Yet,  the  most  interesting thought  comes to  us  from a note  of  the 29th  chapter  of
Mead’s work.
Fabbrichesi, “Peirce, Mead, and the Theory of Extended Mind” | 9
Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce (http://www.commens.org)
In defending a social theory of mind we are defending a functional, as opposed to any form of
substantive or entitative, view as to its nature. And in particular, we are opposing all intracranial or
intraepidermal views as to its character and locus. For it follows from our social theory of mind that
the field of mind must be co-extensive with the field of the social process of experience and behavior
[…] If mind is socially constituted, then the field or the locus of any given individual mind must
extend as far as the social activity or apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends; and
hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs.
(Mead 1934: 223, n. 25)
Fifty-five years before Clark and Chalmers a very similar path had been already taken by
Mead. Yet, as Peirce once said about Royce, Mead’s perspective “differs but by a hair-
breadth” from the cognitivist view. In the following concluding remarks, I am going to
show in what this slight but crucial difference really lies.
We have just seen how the metaphor of extension is common to both Mead’s social
psychology and the extended-mind theory.  However,  Clark and Chalmers,  as  Mead
would have probably said, presuppose the mind without discussing its emergence; they
presuppose what should be explained instead. Moreover, it is sufficiently clear to Mead
that there is no “mental” center that progressively crosses the boundaries of its own
circumference to include new external parts; rather, “mental states” and self-awareness
are the product of habits of response, of gestures that have become significant acts.
Cognition does not mean becoming extended. Rather, it is the practice in which we are
embedded  –  which  is  never  only  reflexive  and  individual  –  that  generates  new
dimensions of meaning, of symbolization, of acknowledgment, and, in the long run, a
progressive internalization and mentalization. The Clark-Chalmers thesis is completely
turned on its head: it is from experience, from the so-called ‘outside’, that we get our
material  for  beliefs,  desires,  and  reflections;  and  consciousness  is  produced  as  a
repercussion of the processes of social communication. In other words, it is the act, the
habit of response – the threshold which is neither red nor blue, as Peirce said, and then
it is both red and blue – that fixes gradually the boundaries of the mental and the
physical, of the internal and the external.
My suggestion is then to talk not of an “extended” mind, but rather of an “intensive”
experience  of  signification.  Let  me  explain  this  terminology.  Moving  from Mead’s
position, it is possible to interpret the processes of mentalization as that process that is
constantly in the making and that is the result of an interaction with the environment.
While “extension” is the name for describing the act of going from “inside” something to
“outside”  that  something,  “intension”  could  be  the  name  that  evokes  the  tension
between two poles that only in their relation are constituted as such (we might use the
word “intensity” here).
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We have seen that the real point in the discussion of the extended mind theory is to
understand what is inside the mind and what is outside, and where is the boundary,
threshold, or limit from which something gets expanded, stretched out, spread out (all
meanings that can be traced back to the Latin word ex-tendere).  On the contrary,
according to the intensive model just sketched, we have only a habit of response, the
result of public and social practices, that gets contracted into the singularity of the
action  and  the  recognition  of  its  meaning.  Following  a  long  tradition  going  from
Nicholas of Cusa to Spinoza, we could speak of a contraction of the world into the
finitude  of  each  event.  The  extension  of  public  thinking  can  be  then  said  to  be
intensively present in each singular mode of conduct and in any mind. We could also
refer to one of the fathers of philosophy, Heraclitus, who in fragment 45 writes: “You
will not find out the limits of the soul when you go, travelling on every road, so deep
logos does it have.” According to Bruno Snell’s interpretation, the depth (bathun) that
Heraclitus attributes to the soul is a total novelty for the archaic culture (Snell 1953, Ch.
1). In it we find something completely different from the physicality and dimensionality
of an organ. “Depth” means the intensity, so to speak, of an experience, more than its
verticality. From one side, Heraclitus refers to a path to be taken and to the limits of the
mind; and so he takes us to the initial theses from which we have started. Yet, what is
clear is that the logos is interpreted as something deep, powerful, intensive. It has no
limits, because it does not have physical dimensions. Its quality is the koinon, the being
common to all  (fragment 2). What we see here is the beginning of the idea of the
inscription of the social world into the logical mind.
In this way, every concept that is ‘in the mind’ – every sign – is a point of condensation,
of concentration, of intension, of the unlimited practical interactions that characterize
every  social  existence.  In  other  words,  the  cognitive  is  the  intensive  trait  of
the pragmatic.
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Notes
On this point, see especially Adkins (1970) and Snell (1953). It could also be interesting to1.
read the thesis by Jaynes (2000). ↩︎
Of course, in a Cartesian horizon mind is more a res cogitans than a res extensa.2.
Notwithstanding, Descartes saw the res cogitans as something without spatial properties, yet
localized somewhere (in the skull). With Clark and Chalmers, the principle of localization still
appears to be fundamental to interpret the mind, and their choice to use the adjective
“extended” is curious, as it reminds us of Descartes’ attributes concerning the res extensa. ↩︎
For an enactivist criticism of this position, see Hutto & Myin (2013). ↩︎3.
